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THE GLOBAL DILEMMA IN SHORT
SELLING REGULATION: IOSCO’S
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE PROPOSALS
AND THE POTENTIAL FOR REGULATORY
ARBITRAGE
INTRODUCTION

T

he tumultuous events leading up to the financial crisis in the fall of
2008 resulted in the rapid enactment of global securities rules and
regulations that were designed to limit, curb, or outright ban short selling
activity. Undoubtedly, Credit Default Swaps1 played a critical role in
corroding the global economy by providing insurance on risky mortgage
bonds and encouraging reckless behavior during the housing bubble.2
However, according to many regulatory authorities, short sellers greatly
exacerbated global economic turmoil, driving some of the world’s largest
financial institutions to the brink of ruin.3 Indeed, some industry experts
debate that the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., (“Lehman
Brothers”)—the largest in history—could have been avoided had Wall
Street been restrained from “practicing one of its darkest arts.”4 The
same experts have expressed concerns that certain short selling techniques may amount to “gasoline on the fire” in distressed markets.5
In order to respond to unprecedented deterioration of market stability
and investor confidence in the financial sector, national regulatory authorities imposed bans or additional restrictions on short selling with
great haste and little or no notice.6 The resulting regulatory measures exposed a general lack of consistency among national regulators concerning the types of restrictions imposed on short selling as well as short po1. A Credit Default Swap (“CDS”) is a contract, where the buyer pays a premium
and the seller agrees to make a specific payment if a particular event, such as a bond default, occurs. Thus, if an investor is holding certain bonds and is concerned that the issuer
will not be able to pay, purchasing CDSs should cover the potential loss. In this manner,
CDS transfers credit risk among market participants. See Nicholas Varchaver & Katie
Benner, The $55 Trillion Question, FORTUNE, Oct. 13, 2008, at 134.
2. See id.
3. Tom Lauricella, Lehman Legacy Alters Global Markets. Short-Sellers Took Flak
as Stocks Fell, But Did Ban Help?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2009, at C1.
4. Gary Matsumoto, Naked Short Sales Hint Fraud in Bringing Down Lehman,
(Mar.
19,
2009),
BLOOMBERG.COM
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=aB1jlqmFOTCA.
5. Id. (quoting U.S. Senator Ted Kaufman).
6. Kym Sheehan, Principled Regulatory Action? The Case of Short Selling 1 (Mar.
12,
2009)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1368531.
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sition disclosure requirements.7 In order to resolve this global regulatory
disparity, the Task Force of the Technical Committee8 of the International Organization of Securities Commission (“IOSCO” or the “organization”)9 issued its Final Report on Regulation of Short Selling (“Short
Selling Report”).10 The report identified the primary risks attributed to
short selling and proposed four regulatory principles designed to limit
those risks, while retaining certain market benefits associated with short
selling activity.11 However, while IOSCO’s Short Selling Report aimed
at providing a consistent global approach to short selling regulation in

7. See id.
8. IOSCO’s Technical Committee is a “specialized working group, made up of fifteen agencies that regulate some of the world’s larger, more developed and internationalized markets.” Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Launches Task Force
On
Recent
Market
Events
(Nov.
8,
2007),
available
at
http://www.iasplus.com/iosco/0711subprime.pdf. Its objective is to review major regulatory issues related to international securities and futures transactions and to coordinate
practical responses to these concerns. Id. Kathleen Casey, Commissioner, Securities and
Exchange Commission, is the Chairman of the Technical Committee. Members of the
ORG.
OF
SEC.
COMM’NS,
Technical
Committee,
INT’L
http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_committees.cfm?cmtid=3 (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
Other members of the Technical Committee are regulatory agencies located in the Netherlands, Australia, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Ontario, Quebec,
Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. The Technical Committee’s Task Force is generally comprised of the same agencies as the Technical Committee
but is chaired by the Securities and Futures Committee, Hong Kong. See INT’L ORG. OF
SEC. COMM’NS, CONSULTATION REPORT REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING (2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD289.pdf [hereinafter SHORT
SELLING REPORT]; IOSCO Committee Lists, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS,
http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_committees.cfm?cmtid=3 (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
9. IOSCO is the International Organization of Securities Commissions comprised of
member agencies that have resolved, through its permanent structures, “to cooperate
together to promote high standards of regulation in order to maintain just, efficient and
sound markets; to exchange information on their respective experiences in order to promote the development of domestic markets; to unite their efforts to establish standards
and an effective surveillance of international securities transactions; to provide mutual
assistance to promote the integrity of the markets by a rigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement against offenses.” See About IOSCO, INT’L ORG. OF
SEC. COMM’NS, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2009). The Objectives
and Principles of Securities Regulation published by IOSCO in February of 2008 set out
the three objectives of securities regulation: (1) the protection of investors, (2) ensuring
that markets are fair, efficient and transparent, and (3) the reduction of systemic risk. See
INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION at
i (2008), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf [hereinafter OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES REPORT].
10. See SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8.
11. Id.
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the areas of compliance, enforcement, and disclosure obligations,12 the
Short Selling Report did not offer a specific regulatory mechanism to
achieve these goals.13
This Note will suggest that IOSCO’s one-size-fits-all approach to short
selling regulation ultimately fails to set forth meaningful regulatory standards that are applicable on an international basis. This Note will further
intimate that the absence of such standards, especially with regard to
consistent information disclosure obligations, may result in information
asymmetry among jurisdictions, leaving the gate open for regulatory
short selling arbitrage, which hinders market efficiency. Finally, this
Note will conclude that IOSCO should address concerns arising from the
dissonance in short selling disclosure regulations by implementing meaningful and consistent disclosure and reporting standards. In this vein,
IOSCO could follow the Committee of European Securities Regulators’
(“CESR”) approach14 in determining the most consistent regulatory disclosure requirements, which maximize the utility of short selling information in the market. Such measures would undoubtedly promote the
effectiveness of global short selling regulation and minimize the risk of
regulatory arbitrage.
II. BACKGROUND
The objective of the Short Selling Report was to develop broad regulatory principles designed to assist domestic regulators in constructing a
national short selling regulatory regime.15 The goal of IOSCO’s proposed
principles was to enhance investor protection, market fairness, efficiency, and transparency, and to reduce systemic risk.16 In this vein, the organization considered the nature of short selling, its risks and benefits,
and its role in the global economy.17 IOSCO’s four principles of short
selling regulation discussed in this Note reflect the organization’s view
that while short selling plays an important role in the global markets, certain methods of short selling, such as naked short selling, pose serious
economic risks and should be restrained.18

12. Id. at 4–5.
13. Id.
14. For a discussion of CESR approach, see infra Part III.
15. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 (discussing the background and purpose of IOSCO’s four principles of short selling regulation in the Executive Summary).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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A. The Benefits and Risks of Short Selling in the Global Economy
Although the precise legal definition of short selling varies according
to jurisdiction, a transaction is generally defined as a short sale when it
involves the sale of stock that the seller does not legally own at the time
of the sale.19 Investors normally seek to make a profit from constantly
fluctuating prices of securities that are traded on the markets.20 If investors believe that a company’s stock price will decline (e.g., due to the
company’s announcement of lower than anticipated earnings), they will
place themselves in a position to profit from this event by selling the
company’s stock.21 However, if such investors do not own the company’s stock at the relevant time, they may borrow22 the stock from other
investors (or “lenders”), sell it in the market, and deliver it to the buyer.23
If the short seller is correct in thinking that the stock’s price will decline,
he or she will purchase the stock at the lower price and return it to the
lender, thereby making a profit.24
The utility of short selling has historically been a subject of debate between those who espouse the ability of short selling to increase market
transparency25 and critics, who highlight its propensity to destabilize se-

19. IOSCO’s Technical Committee accumulated certain short selling features common to most jurisdictions into a ‘bucketed’ definition. A particular transaction is defined
as a falling within the ‘realm of short selling’ if it consists of the following two factors:
(1) a sale of stock and (2) that the seller does not own at the point of sale. SHORT SELLING
REPORT, supra note 8 at 24; see also Piero Cinquegrana, Short Selling: A Known Unknown (European Capital Mkts. Inst., ECMI Commentary No. 23/29, 2009), available at
http://www.ceps.eu/node/1671.
20. ELIOT NORTON, ON “SHORT SALES” OF SECURITIES THROUGH A STOCKBROKER 5–6
(1907).
21. Id.
22. Shares are often borrowed from a long-term share owner, such as an insurance
fund or a pension fund, and the owner will receive lending fees from the borrower. See
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, SHORT SELLING, DISCUSSION PAPER, 2009, 09/1, at 6,
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp09_01.pdf [hereinafter FSA SHORT
SELLING PAPER].
23. Id.
24. In other words, the classic theory for short selling rests upon the premise that an
investor believes that negative information concerning an issuer (such as lower earnings,
major litigation, or a downturn in the sector) will lead to a decline in the price of its publicly-traded securities. Based on this belief, the investor will sell the stock at the current
price, deliver the borrowed shares to the buyer, and repurchase those shares later in the
market when the share price will purportedly be lower based on the investor’s theory.
NORTON, supra note 20, at 5; Sheehan, supra note 6.
25. Transparency may be defined as the degree to which information about trading is
made publicly-available on a real-time basis. OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES REPORT, supra
note 9, at 6.
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curity prices during stressful market periods.26 Proponent economists
consider short selling to be instrumental in “unearthing overvalued companies and contributing to efficient stock prices.”27 For instance, some
market analysts believe that without the ability to short sell, stock prices
would rise and become overvalued, shutting relevant negative information out of the market.28 In this manner, short selling contributes to the
price discovery of a particular security.29 Certain empirical evidence also
highlights that short sellers tend to be the better informed market participants and when short sellers are shut out of the market, stocks tend to be
more expensive and generate abnormally low future returns.30 In sum,
the benefits incurred by the market from nonabusive short selling activity
include correcting overpriced stock, facilitating hedging and risk management techniques,31 and providing liquidity32 to the markets.33
Conversely, critics of short selling consider it to be a largely speculative and high risk activity.34 A short seller has the potential to incur essentially unlimited losses if the price of the security continuously rises
26. Id.
27. The benefits of short selling are also evidenced by the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s repeal of the uptick rule and other price tests in 2007 in order to “simplify” short sale regulation. See SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 25. See generally
Ekkehart Boehmer, Charles M. Jones & Xiaoyan Zhang, Shackling Short Sellers: The
2008 Shorting Ban (Johnson Sch., Research Paper Series No. 34-09, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1412844.
28. Boehmer, Jones & Zhang, supra note 27, at 2.
29. Price discovery could be described as a method of determining the price of a specific security through basic supply and demand factors related to the market. Investopedia, Price Discovery, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pricediscovery.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
30. Boehmer, Jones & Zhang, supra note 27, at 3.
31. For example, curtailing the risk of a long position in stock or call options via establishing a short position in the stock. See id.
32. Liquidity may be defined as “being readily convertible to cash.” With respect to
securities, a stock is considered liquid when there are enough shares trading in the market
so that large transactions can occur without substantial price variations. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); see also Lauricella, supra note 3.
33. See Boehmer, Jones & Zhang, supra note 27.
34. THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES REGULATORS (“CESR”), MEASURES
ADOPTED BY CESR MEMBERS ON SHORT SELLING, CESR/08–742 (2009) (emphasizing
that unregulated short selling may increase market risk) [hereinafter CESR SHORT
SELLING MEASURES]. CESR is an independent Committee of European Securities Regulators.
See
CESR
in
Short,
http://www.cesreu.org/index.php?page=cesrinshort&mac=0&id= (last visited Dec. 10, 2009). CESR’s
mission is to improve coordination among securities regulators, act as an advisory group
to assist the EU Commission and work to ensure more consistent and timely day-to-day
implementation of community legislation in the Member States. Id.
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rather than falls.35 Furthermore, market authorities stipulate that unregulated short selling may lead to more serious and damaging consequences
such as creation of disorderly markets, settlement disruptions, and market abuse.36 In fact, many commentators have blamed short sellers for
past stock market declines and crashes—from the financial troubles of
the East India Company in 1609, to the stock market crash of 1929, to
the 2008 global financial crisis.37 Thus, most market authorities attempt
to regulate short selling with an objective of retaining the benefits, while
mitigating the risks.38
In the Short Selling Report, IOSCO classified the risks inherent in unregulated short selling activity into three categories of regulatory and
market risk, which are common to most jurisdictions.39 The first category
concerns the accelerant-like effect of short selling on an issuer that
creates a spiraling downward pressure on the share prices of stock. Essentially, the speed and weight of aggressive short selling may cause
market disorder when investors do not have enough time to respond to
the increasing downward pressure on the stock. 40 This activity may
cause potential buyers to withhold from purchasing the security and encourage holders of the security to sell it.41 If the price of the stock decreases exponentially, the issuer will have difficulty borrowing money
and attracting investors, such that it cannot improve its financial condition before its stock becomes worthless.42 When the issuer is a bank, ag35. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REPORT ON TRANSPARENCY OF SHORT SELLING 7
(2003), available at http:// www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD147.pdf [hereinafter TRANSPARENCY REPORT].
36. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 34–60388, 73 Fed.
Reg. 61,706 at 5–7, 8 (Oct. 14, 2008); see also CESR SHORT SELLING MEASURES, supra
note 34.
37. INT’L SEC. LENDING ASS’N, SECURITIES LENDING AND SHORT SELLING (2009),
available
at
http://www.isla.co.uk/uploadedFiles/Member_Area/General_Library/SECURITIES%20L
ENDING%20AND%20SHORT%20SELLING%20(3).pdf (“The International Securities
Lending Association (ISLA) is a trade association established in 1989 to represent the
common interests of participants in the securities lending industry. ISLA has more than
100 members comprising insurance companies, pension funds, asset managers, banks and
securities dealers representing more than 4,000 clients. Whilst based in London, ISLA
represents members from more than twenty countries in Europe, the Middle East, Africa
and North America.”) [hereinafter SECURITIES LENDING AND SHORT SELLING].
38. See, e.g., Boehmer, Jones & Zhang, supra note 27.
39. See generally Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 36; FSA SHORT
SELLING, supra note 22; SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8.
40. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 7, 22.
41. FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22, at 12.
42. Id. at 11–14.
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gressive short selling of the bank’s shares may also lead to depositor
run.43 In this sense, normal fluctuations of stock prices are exacerbated
by aggressive short selling, which has the potential to lead the issuer into
bankruptcy even though it may be otherwise well-capitalized.44 Therefore, the activity of aggressive short selling may itself be disorderly, in
addition to the fact that the outcome of such activity may lead to undesirable consequences.45
The second regulatory concern identified by IOSCO is the potential for
abusive market behavior.46 Abusive market behavior is apparent when
short selling, accompanied by false rumors designed to encourage others
to sell, drives down the price of the security and triggers a large profit at
the expense of the issuer whose security is being oversold.47 The regulatory concern highlighted in this instance is that short selling may provide
a valuable tool for those who intend to abuse the market.48 Regulators
often define market abuse or market manipulation as an illegal “intentional interference with the free forces of supply and demand.”49 Although the definition of manipulative activity varies slightly among jurisdictions, most regulatory authorities recognize that when a market participant spreads false rumors designed to encourage others to sell, and he
or she sells the security in question, such activity is a “clear case of abusive behavior.”50
43. A depositor run or “bank run” takes place when the customers of a bank fear that
the bank will become insolvent. Customers rush to the bank to take out their money as
quickly as possible to avoid losing it. In this situation, short selling may become a rapid
self-fulfilling prophesy resulting in the potential collapse of issuers that are targeted by
the short sellers. About.com: Economics, Bank Run—Dictionary Definition of Bank Run,
http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/bank_run.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2010); see also FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22, at 12.
44. TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35, at 22.
45. See SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8.
46. Id at 22.
47. Id.
48. SECURITIES LENDING AND SHORT SELLING, supra note 37, at 4 (explaining that
propensity to abuse the market may arise from any other form of trading, so the regulatory concern in this instance is not that short selling is an abusive strategy in itself).
49. John D. Finnerty, Short Selling, Death Spiral Convertibles, and the Profitability
of Stock Manipulation 2–4 (Mar. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=687282 (explaining that manipulative
trading strategies—such as releasing false information about a company into the market,
naked short selling and employing trading strategies that impede the price formation
process—corrupt the market’s price formation process, and inject misleading information
into the market to move stock prices in the direction that benefits the manipulator. It is
important to note that market manipulation can be profitable when there is a difference
between the price elasticity of purchases and sales that the manipulator can exploit).
50. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 22.
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For example, some market authorities blamed abusive short selling for
exacerbating the circumstances which eventually led to the collapse of
Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. (“Bear Stearns”) and Lehman Brothers.51 According to the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), market conditions
in the fall of 2008 led to an unacceptably high risk of abusive behavior,
precipitated by false rumors and aggressive short selling, which created
self-fulfilling prophesies with respect to the collapse of already vulnerable issuers (such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers).52 In a similar
manner, some market analysts contend that American International
Group, Inc. (“AIG”) may have averted the need for government financial
assistance had its stock price not been driven down by short sellers, thereby triggering a credit downgrade, which then required the company to
raise $14 billion in capital overnight in order to meet collateral requirements on its credit default swaps.53
The third regulatory concern identified by IOSCO regarding short selling is the potential for settlement54 disruption, which causes difficulties
for the purchasers of the security.55 Settlement disruption56 may arise in
the context of “naked” short selling, where the short seller has not borrowed or arranged to borrow the securities ahead of the sale.57 As a result, the seller fails to deliver securities to the buyer when delivery is
due.58 Naked short selling may increase the potential for market abuse by

51. Bill Saporito, Are Short Sellers to Blame for the Financial Crisis?, TIME, Sept.
18, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1842499,00.html.
52. FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22.
53. Saporito, supra note 51.
54. “Settlement” is the date on which payment is made for a trade. For stocks traded
on US exchanges, settlement is currently three business days after the trade. In some
regional markets, foreign shares may require months to settle. Id; see also Bloomberg
Financial Glossary, http://www.bloomberg.com/invest/glossary/bfgloss.htm (last visited
Oct. 19, 2009).
55. See Saporito, supra note 51.
56. Settlement disruption is a situation where one party pays for the shares he or she
purchased and the counterparty (i.e., the short seller) does not deliver the shares (and
vice-versa). See SECURITIES LENDING AND SHORT SELLING, supra note 37. Short selling
carries with it a certain level of “settlement risk.” Id. Settlement risk, sometimes called
“Herstatt risk,” was “named after the well-known failure of the German bank Herstatt
whose license was withdrawn by regulators on June 26 1974 due to its inability to cover
its liabilities. This forced the bank into liquidation and it ceased operating.” Reuters Financial Glossary, http://glossary.reuters.com/index.php?title=Herstatt_Risk&redirect=no
(last visited Oct. 16, 2009).. When German banking regulators closed the bank down,
counter parties were left with substantial losses. Id.
57. Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 36, at 5.
58. This is also known as “failure to deliver” or “fail.” See SEC, Naked Short Sales,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/nakedshortsale.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2009).
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manipulating the price of a particular security.59 Price manipulation occurs when the naked short seller creates an overall imbalance in the
supply and demand in the securities markets, thereby influencing the
price of the targeted issuer’s stock.60 Without the stock borrowing requirement, a short sale effectively increases the supply of a targeted issuer’s stock, which, in turn, decreases the stock’s price.61 The theory is that
the artificial increase in a company’s outstanding stock62 essentially devalues it,63 and the failure to deliver the shares is tantamount to issuing
new stock without the company’s permission.64 The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has recognized that short sellers may intentionally fail to deliver securities as part of a scheme to manipulate (i.e.,
artificially decrease) their price. The injection into the market of misleading information concerning the supply and the price of an issuer’s stock
causes unwarranted reputational damage to the issuer and undermines
investor confidence in the issuer’s financial stability.65 In addition, untimely delivery may hinder the purchaser’s ability to meet obligations
with respect to an onward series of transactions.66
Naked short selling also gives rise to potential corporate governance
issues.67 For example, when naked short selling leads to settlement failure, shareholders are deprived of their stock ownership benefits, such as

59. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 23.
60. Id.
61. See FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22; Boehmer, Jones & Zhang, supra
note 27.
62. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 108 (9th ed. 2007) (explaining that outstanding stock, also known
as issued stock, is stock that has been authorized to be issued by the company in its certificate of incorporation).
63. For example, the same thing happens to a currency when a government prints
more of it. Lauricella, supra note 3 at 2 (quoting Susanne Trimbath, a trade-settlement
expert and president of STP Advisory Services).
64. Id.
65. Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 36, at 5–8 (For example, in Rhino
Advisors, Inc. and Thomas Badian, Lit. Rel. No. 18003 (Feb. 27, 2003), the SEC alleged
that the defendants profited from “engaging in massive naked short selling that flooded
the market with the [issuer’s] stock and depressed its price”); FSA SHORT SELLING
PAPER, supra note 23 at 11; Brooke Masters, Crackdown on ‘Naked Short-Selling Intensifies, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at C2.
66. SHORT SELLING REPORT supra note 8, at 23 (explaining that disruption of timely
settlement of shares also contributes to wider systemic risk); see also Amendments to
Regulation SHO, supra note 36, at 6 (“large and persistent fails to deliver may deprive
shareholders of the benefits of ownership such as voting and lending.” In addition, the
seller avoids incurring the costs normally required to borrow the security.).
67. Finnerty, supra note 49, at 6 n.9 (explaining the corporate governance issue).
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voting.68 This is because the buyer of so-called “phantom shares” created
by the naked short seller believes that they are real shares and therefore
hold voting rights. Consequently, “if brokers send the proxy materials to
owners of phantom shares who then vote for them, there could be more
votes cast for the directors than actually exist.”
The impact of settlement disruption is illustrated in the collapse of
Lehman Brothers. Because of the lack of controls applicable to short selling, “as many as 32.8 million shares in Lehman Brothers were sold and
not delivered to buyers on time as of Sept. 11[, 2008], according to data
compiled by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Bloomberg.”
69
Many industry professionals believed that the naked short selling of
Lehman Brothers stock, coupled with the alleged spread of false rumors
designed to encourage others to sell the stock, may have been largely
responsible for the firm’s demise. 70 In a similar case, stock delivery failures increased for Bear Stearns as well, peaking the day after it was announced that JPMorgan Chase & Co. would acquire the company for two
dollars per share.71 Although both Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns
were experiencing grave financial problems during 2008, the theory was
that short sellers were exacerbating the situation by driving their stock
prices lower than they should have been with such speed that recovery
was virtually impossible.72
Without regulatory constraints, naked short selling may threaten the
stability of broader markets and create “systemic risk.”73 Systemic risk
has been broadly defined as the potential breakdown in an entire system,
where “an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence . . .
in a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to . .
. have significant adverse effects on the real economy.”74 In this scenario,
the magnitude and/or speed of short selling are not constrained by the
short seller’s ability to borrow the stock in the market before executing
the sale.75 This trading technique generally increases the manipulator’s
68. SECURITIES LENDING AND SHORT SELLING, supra note 37, at 4.
69. Matsumoto, supra note 4.
70. Id. at 1 (quoting Richard Fuld, former Chief Executive Officer of Lehman Brothers).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Posting of Alex Singleton to Telegraph, Short Selling Helped Promote
Truth About HBOS and Lehman Brothers, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk (Sept. 18, 2008).
73. See FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22.
74. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., G10 REPORT ON CONSOLIDATION IN
THE
FINANCIAL
SECTOR
(2001),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,end_2649_34593_1895868_1_1_1_1,00.html
[hereinafter G10 REPORT].
75. FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22, at 11; see also id.
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profit and aggravates price decline of the underlying stock.76 In this
sense, naked short selling can be especially damaging to an issuer’s stock
price because “ignoring the regulatory requirement to borrow the shares
eliminates the main quantitative constraint on the amount of short selling
and intensifies the resulting downward pressure on price.”77 Significant
price declines in the stock of issuers that has been subject to extensive
naked short selling can create a crisis in investor confidence without a
fundamental underlying reason. In the financial world, contagious loss of
investor confidence in the market creates a high probability of systemic
breakdown.78 Once a financial event has become systemic, economic
effects may include bank runs, failures of illiquid but solvent firms, and
reductions in the supply of funds to finance profitable investment opportunities.79
B. Regulatory Restraints on Short Selling
Due to the risks posed by unregulated short selling, regulatory authorities in countries with the most active global capital markets have maintained some forms of restrictive measures controlling naked short selling
activities. 80 The events leading up to the bankruptcies of Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers led regulators worldwide to conclude that short
selling was used in an abusive manner, creating widespread investor panic and destabilizing the markets.81 As part of its response to the ensuing
market instability, the SEC, for example, issued a temporary order restricting short selling in the shares of 19 financial firms deemed systemi76. Finnerty, supra 49, at 5–6, 33.
77. At the extreme, short position in a stock may even exceed a firm’s entire supply
of outstanding shares. Id. at 33.
78. See G10 REPORT, supra note 74.
79. See id. (explaining that most systemic crises that have occurred in G10 and other
countries in the past 50 years have exhibited at least one of the defining characteristics of
systemic risk).
80. Cinquegrana, supra note 19, at 10–14 (explaining that although “different jurisdictions use the term ‘naked’ in slightly different ways, the common regulatory concern .
. . is that a seller does not own the stock he is selling and has made no provision to borrow or provide for delivery of stock to the purchaser by the settlement date”); see, e.g.,
Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 36 (where the SEC has made permanent a
temporary rule that was approved in 2008 in response to continuing concerns regarding
“fails to deliver” and potentially abusive “naked” short selling. In particular, temporary
Rule 204T makes it a violation of Regulation SHO and imposes penalties if a market
participant does not purchase or borrow shares to close—out a “fail to deliver” resulting
from a short sale in any equity security. . . . Moreover, Regulation SHO reflects the
SEC’s concern that “pervious restrictions on short selling had not been effective in preventing its use as manipulative device).
81. See Matsumoto, supra note 4; see also FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22.
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cally important, by reinforcing the penalties for failing to deliver the
shares on time.82 In September 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission temporarily banned short selling in 799 stocks, while the FSA
instituted its own short selling ban on 29 leading financial stocks.83
When the financial crisis of 2008 reached international markets, global
regulatory agencies took emergency actions to further restrain, or outright prohibit short selling activities. The regulatory efforts included outright jurisdiction-wide bans on short selling, partial bans on certain types
of short selling activities, and the institution of short position disclosure
and reporting requirements in view of the permitted short selling activities.84
However, the regulatory measures implemented by global market authorities in order to restrain potentially abusive short selling were largely
dissimilar across jurisdictions.85 Regulatory judgments of what constituted abusive short selling varied according to jurisdiction. In addition,
domestic regulatory efforts were largely uncoordinated with respect to
the types of restrictions imposed on short selling and short position disclosure requirements.86 For example, after the SEC banned short selling
for 799 stocks in September 2008, Taiwan, Netherlands, and France
enacted outright country-wide bans of all short selling activities.87 Full
bans on short selling were eventually lifted in all jurisdictions with developed capital markets. Consequently, many national regulators enhanced certain disclosure-based controls over short selling.88
82. Searching for the Naked Truth (Aug. 2008), ECONOMIST, available at
http://www.economist.com/finance/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=11951246.
83. Cinquegrana, supra note 19, at 5.
84. Sheehan, supra note 6, at 1–2.
85. TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35.
86. Id.
87. Australia suspended covered short selling on all stocks. Cinquegrana supra note
19, at 5. Canadian regulatory authority also banned the short selling of all financial
stocks. Id.
88. IOSCO’s Technical Committee recognized the concern stemming from unregulated short-selling activities:
The Technical Committee believes that short selling plays an important role in
the market for a variety of reasons, such as providing more efficient price discovery, mitigating market bubbles, increasing market liquidity, facilitating
hedging and other risk management activities. However, there is also a general
concern that especially in extreme market conditions, certain types of short selling, or the use of short selling in combination with certain abusive strategies,
may contribute to disorderly markets.
SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 (quoting the Executive Summary of the Report); see also TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35.
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The implementation of short position disclosure requirements reflects
the theory that short position disclosure generally provides valuable information to the market 89 and informed markets are less prone to manipulation and disorder.90 Valuable information related to short selling activity, if widely available, could enhance market transparency, which is
one of the theoretical conditions required for the free markets to function
efficiently.91 Essentially, well-informed markets exhibit less information
asymmetry and present less opportunity for arbitrageurs to profit at the
expense of uninformed market participants. Sufficient disclosure can also
remove the opportunity for market manipulators to spread false rumors
designed to influence trading activity, and can thereby deter market manipulation.92 However, when regulatory disclosure requirements differ
among jurisdictions,93 the timeliness and availability of information in
those jurisdictions are affected. As a consequence, regulatory efforts
aimed at curbing market manipulation may be undermined if manipulators take advantage of information asymmetry among different jurisdictions.
C. The Risks Information Asymmetry and the Potential for Regulatory
Arbitrage
Conventional financial theory suggests that market efficiency stems
from informational efficiency. For example, a market may be more efficient when security prices reflect more information useful to investors
within shorter periods of time.94 Information asymmetry can occur when
one market participant has more or better information than another market participant. 95 This creates an imbalance of power in transactions,
giving rise to potentially large discrepancies between buy and sell orders
when better-informed participants exploit their informational advantage.96
89. See TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35.
90. Id.
91. A market is said to be transparent if information is available with regard to the
relevant assets and prices trading on the market. Id.
92. Id.
93. For example, in some jurisdictions disclosure involves publishing cumulative
short sales volumes in individual securities on a daily basis, while in others it involves
periodic publication of the overall short position in individual securities as measured at
specific moment. See id. at 14, 21.
94. Amir N Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation
in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 563, 564, 567 (1998).
95. See Stephen Brown & Stephen A. Hillegeist, How Disclosure Quality Affects the
Level of Information Asymmetry, 12 REV. ACCT. STUD. 443 (2007).
96. See id.
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Some studies suggest that over a long time horizon, there is a negative
association between disclosure quality and information asymmetry.97
Analogously, higher quality of information disclosure may contribute to
the balancing of power among the buyers and sellers in the market, or
decrease the average level of asymmetry among investors. This phenomenon can be applied to regulatory short position disclosure requirements.98 Any market efficiencies created by short selling have the potential of being offset by the information asymmetry with regard to other
market participants who are unaware of the short sales.99 This may be
especially true in developed capital markets, where the prices of publicly-traded securities reflect a “mechanism for communicating information.”100 Thus, failing to disclose the amount of short interest in a stock
may remove certain negative information about the issuer from the market, rendering the market less efficient. It is important to note, however,
that disclosure quality and effectiveness ultimately depends on the
amount, timeliness, and precision of the disclosed information.101
Even though disclosure-based short selling regulations exist in many
jurisdictions, these regulations vary with respect to the scope of the disclosures and short position reporting requirements. Divergent disclosure
regulations also give rise to regulatory compliance issues for companies
that operate internationally.102 These companies are operationally and
financially burdened by having to comply with a multiplicity of different
regimes.103 Arguably, the greater concern is a threat to market efficiency,
where different short position disclosure requirements among jurisdictions may lead to information asymmetry and open the gate for regulatory arbitrage.
Regulatory conflicts may develop when some jurisdictions take the
view that the market is benefitted by rigorous short position disclosures,
while other jurisdictions deem such disclosure requirements to be inefficient or prefer different disclosure approaches. The ensuing divergence
in regulatory regimes may give rise to regulatory arbitrage, which indicates a migration trend toward the more lenient regulatory regimes, and
is often associated with a “race to the bottom” argument.104 The race to
97. See id. (referencing studies of information asymmetry and disclosures).
98. Empirical studies suggest that this will occur over a long time period. Id.
99. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 14.
100. Licht, supra note 94, at 609 (citing F. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society,
35 AM. ECON. REV. 527 (1945)).
101. Brown and Hillegeist, supra note 95, at 26.
102. FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22, at 23.
103. Id.
104. See Licht, supra note 94.
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the bottom argument recognizes that when two jurisdictions with different regulatory regimes are pitted against each other, market participants
will find a way to adopt whatever regulatory framework they feel is
best.105 When competing regulatory regimes simultaneously interact with
one another, certain externalities are exerted on those subject to a particular regime.106 One such externality is the erosion of regulatory effect
on market participants.107 This may develop when companies have multiple stock listings and international operations. 108 For example, if one
jurisdiction implements stringent exchange-listing rules for the purpose
of curbing certain activity, a company may avoid the more stringent rules
by listing its stock in a different jurisdiction with less demanding listing
standards.109
Similarly, with respect to information disclosure obligations, when a
stock trades on multiple markets with varying regulatory disclosure regimes, arbitrageurs may use trading information obtained from one jurisdiction, which is untimely or unavailable in another jurisdiction, in order
to profit at the expense of uninformed market participants. In this regulatory arbitrage scenario, the economic “law of one price” theory is significantly shattered.110 This theory holds that “if an identical commodity or
asset sells in two different markets, then the price of this item should be
the same barring transaction costs.”111 “Departure from [this theory] may
lead to arbitrage profits, generated from buying the underpriced security
or selling the overpriced security.”112 In this manner, arbitrageurs may
profit when information obtained from one market indicates that the
same security is overpriced in another market because the latter does not
reflect certain relevant negative information, such as the level of short
interest in the security. After acquiring the necessary negative information about the security in the more informed market, the arbitrageur will
sell what he believes to be an overpriced security in the less informed
market, thereby profiting from the divergence of regulatory disclosure
regimes. Therefore, regulatory arbitrage may occur as a consequence of

105. Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 883, 885–886 (2009); Licht, supra note 94, at 633.
106. Licht, supra note 94, at 633.
107. Id. at 630–33.
108. Id. at 630
109. Id.
110. See id. at 590.
111. Id. (quoting Kiyoshi Kato et al., Are There Arbitrage Opportunities in the Market
for American Depository Receipts?, 1 J. INT’L FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & MONEY 73
(1991)).
112. Id.
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different disclosure regimes when some market participants profit financially from the less informed markets.113
In addition, different short position disclosure requirements may contribute to the free-rider problem.114 In this scenario, a market that captures valuable information through disclosure requirements will invite
free-rider markets, which do not implement rigorous disclosure obligations.115 Essentially, free-riders wind up utilizing the information obtained from more informed markets without incurring the costs of generating that information.116 Another externality of different short position
disclosure requirements is the fact that markets with less rigorous disclosure regimes resort to “chasing” the information.117 Consequently, when
relevant information is conveyed to the free-rider market at a time lag,
arbitrageurs are presented with the opportunity to take advantage of the
less informed markets.
D.
IOSCO’s Role in Implementing Internationally-Consistent Short
Selling Regulatory Principles
As presented above, discerning the consequences of the interactions of
different regulatory regimes is essential when international regulatory
initiatives are considered by such organizations as IOSCO.118 The organization’s members cooperate to propose internationally-consistent regulatory guidelines via published reports or consultation papers.119 IOSCO’s
publications set forth proposed legal or regulatory principles, which are
not automatically codified into binding international or domestic law.120
When the proposed guidelines are accepted and implemented by the international community and domestic securities regulators, IOSCO principles often evolve into “soft law,” which represents “non-binding standards and principles of conduct.”121
As a voluntary international standard-setting body, IOSCO’s soft law
is developed largely through its consultation papers and reports (such as

113. Id. at 567.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 566–67.
116. Id at 566.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 567.
119. Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Launches Task Force On
Recent Market Events, supra note 8.
120. Karmel & Kelly, supra note 105, at 883–86.
121. Id. at 884, 885 (explaining that while IOSCO’s members pledge to implement the
Organization’s standards domestically, the standards do not have the force of either international or domestic law).

2010]

SHORT SELLING DISCLOSURE

981

the Short Selling Report), which aim to guide regulatory behavior.122 On
the surface, IOSCO lacks the force of either international or national law,
and its enforcement power is largely toothless.123 However, IOSCO’s
soft law can “harden” when countries incorporate the organization’s
principles into statutes and binding domestic law.124 In fact, many statutes in the securities field are enacted in response to some current financial concerns, and because international organizations like IOSCO are
generally thought to be more efficient and faster at responding to current
socioeconomic events,125 domestic regulations are often drafted in the
shadow of soft law.126 Therefore, IOSCO’s presence in the international
securities industry has a significant effect on developing effective international regulatory measures, which are likely to be incorporated into
binding domestic securities law.
In the current global markets, securities regulations are no longer considered “domestic” due to the magnitude of financial globalization and
innovation.127 As illustrated by the regulatory arbitrage phenomenon,
regulatory principles implemented in one jurisdiction may have significant consequences on the market participants in other jurisdictions.128
This is the reason that international cooperation by national regulatory
authorities is absolutely vital.129 Indeed, many authorities perceive soft
law as the better medium through which market conditions are addressed
faster and more effectively, both on an international scale and domestically.130 For example, in response to the 2007 market turmoil surrounding Credit Rating Agencies (“CRAs”), United States government offi122. Id. at 894.
123. Id. at 885.
124. Id. at 884 (for example, the SEC incorporated IOSCO’s best practices into binding legal rules governing the US securities industry).
125. “[S]oft law is frequently more informed and more effective than statutory law. . .
.” Id. at 885.
126. Id.
127. Charles McCreevy, European Commissioner, Internal Market and Services, Remarks at the Inaugural Global Financial Services Centre Conference: Regulating in a
Global
Market
(June
16,
2008),
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/33
[hereinafter
McCreevy Speech].
128. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech at FEI 2008 Current Financial Reporting Issues Conference: Future of International Standards and Cooperation in Light of the
Credit
Crisis
(Nov.
18
2008),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch111808cc.htm [hereinafter Cox Speech].
129. Id.
130. Karmel & Kelly, supra note 105, at 890 (emphasizing that the alternative means,
namely treaty and customary law enactments take much longer to develop and conclude,
and do not provide the speed and efficiency needed for dynamic markets).
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cials swiftly passed legislation granting authority to the SEC to exercise
regulatory oversight of CRAs. The SEC turned to IOSCO for assistance
in formulating standards of conduct applicable to CRAs.131 After the
SEC implemented appropriate regulations, the Commission then proceeded with enforcement actions.132
Although IOSCO’s Code of Conduct concerning the regulation of
CRAs was welcomed by some, critics condemned the rules for not going
far enough.133 It became clear to some industry experts that without meaningful and consistent regulatory principles, the process of incorporating
soft law into domestic legislation may lead to under-enforcement of the
established regulations and a lack of efficient compliance mechanisms.134
As a consequence, implementation of IOSCO’s soft law may “leave us
without real rules that actually implement the policies that are
needed.”135 Indeed, some industry experts believe that many of IOSCO’s
recommendations set forth in the Short Selling Report do not provide
meaningful and enforceable regulatory guidelines.136
II. THE REGULATORY APPROACH TO SHORT SELLING — IOSCO’S FOUR
PRINCIPLES
In its Short Selling Report, IOSCO proposes four regulatory principles,
which aim to eliminate “gaps in various regulatory approaches to naked
short selling, including delivery requirements and disclosure of short positions.”137 The goal of IOSCO’s proposed principles is to develop a consistent approach to short selling regulation in the international community.138 The four principles are comprised of the following recommendations:
Short selling should be subject to appropriate controls to reduce or minimize the potential risks that could affect the orderly and efficient
functioning and stability of financial markets;
Short selling should be subject to a reporting regime that provides timely information to the market or market authorities;
Short selling should be subject to an effective compliance and enforcement system;
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 886–96.
Id. at 924–29.
Id. at 928.
Id. at 885–86, 896.
See id. at 932.
McCreevy Speech, supra note 127.
SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
Id.
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Short selling regulation should allow appropriate exceptions for certain
types of transactions for efficient market functioning and development.139

IOSCO’s first three principles identify the significance of placing appropriate controls on short selling activity, implementing consistent short
position disclosure requirements, and ensuring appropriate compliance
and enforcement procedures.140 The fourth principle recognizes that the
practice of short selling has certain market benefits, if conducted in a
regulated, nonabusive manner.141 This Note will briefly discuss the first,
third and fourth principles of short selling regulation. It will then focus
on IOSCO’s second principle, which suggests a short selling reporting
regime that aims to provide timely information to the relevant entities.
The Note will argue that IOSCO’s recommended approach to short position disclosure and reporting requirements does not set forth consistent
regulatory standards applicable on an international level. This Note will
further suggest that allowing some markets to be more informed than
others creates information asymmetry among jurisdictions and invites
regulatory arbitrage. As a possible solution, this Note will offer CESR’s
approach to formulating regulatory short position disclosure standards
for all jurisdictions within the European Union. Finally, this Note will
suggest that while CESR’s specific disclosure standards may not be optimal for all jurisdictions, its formulaic approach offers an effective method of implementing consistent regulatory standards that minimize potential information asymmetry and regulatory arbitrage issues related to
divergent regulatory regimes.
A. An Overview of IOSCO’s First, Third, and Forth Principles of Short
Selling Regulation
In its first principle of short selling regulation, IOSCO recommends a
minimum requirement of enforcing strict settlement of failed trades.142
This can be achieved by compulsory buy-in (or close-out)143 require-

139. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 8.
143. Compulsory buy-in or close-out may be requested by the buyer who has not received the stocks after a certain number of days. Alternatively, the process may be initiated by the central counterparty of the securities settlement system. In addition, some
markets impose monetary penalty on those who have failed to settle their trades within
the standard settlement cycle. See SHORT SELLING REPORT supra note 8, at 10.
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ments. IOSCO also proposes a shorter trade settlement cycle,144 where
trades are settled no later than T+3 (i.e., three days after execution), to
avoid the risk of settlement disruption.145 IOSCO’s recommendations in
this area directly address one of its main concerns with respect to settlement risk (one of the risks closely associated with naked short selling).146
Moreover, IOSCO’s approach to regulating settlement disruption
presents clear regulatory guidelines, which could be applied consistently,
on an international level.
IOSCO’s third principle of short selling regulation addresses the implementation of international compliance and enforcement systems.147
The basic tools for effective cross-border enforcement cooperation are
set out in IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, and
IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (MMOU).148
This Note does not examine compliance and enforcement procedures as
such assessment would draw upon extensive literature analyzing legal
and regulatory systems, as well as the availability of resources dedicated
to such endeavor. IOSCO’s fourth principle deals with exceptions for
certain types of transactions and seems consistent, mutatis mutandis,
with the approach taken by most regulatory authorities with developed
capital markets.149
B. The Need for Consistent Short Selling Information Disclosure Requirements— IOSCO’s Second Principle of Short Selling Regulation
In contrast with IOSCO’s clear standards for settlement discipline formulated under the first principle of short selling regulation, the organization fails to set forth similar guidelines with respect to short selling information disclosure obligations. Instead, the organization’s second principle of short selling regulation confirms what is already known to the
international community: that jurisdictions should “consider some form
of reporting of short selling information either to the market or to market
authorities.”150 However, IOSCO’s proposal does not offer the necessary
144. Settlement cycle is the “time lapse between trade execution to the settlement of
trade.” Id.
145. See id.
146. Strict settlement rules have the potential to discourage and deter abusive short
selling behavior (i.e., “those who short sold with no intention of . . . delivery”). See
SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8.
147. Id. at 17–20.
148. Id.
149. See SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8.
150. Id. at 11–15 (emphasis added).
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regulatory clarity and consistency with respect to disclosure requirements
to the companies and market participants that operate on an international
level.151
Many market authorities have recognized that the globalization of the
securities markets has created a need for the sharing of information
among regulators and market participants.152 In jurisdictions with developed capital markets, some regulators, such as the SEC, aim to regulate
the markets by promoting the disclosure of relevant trading information
rather than directly intervening in the functioning of a free market economy.153 The theory supporting this regulatory approach is that by ensuring that investors possess relevant information, mandatory disclosure
“leverages market discipline as a means of accountability that stands in
contrast to more substantive government oversight.”154 For example, the
inclusion of risk factors in issuer’s prospectuses reflects the SEC’s longheld view that all investors should have access to a “common pool of
knowledge” in order to judge for themselves whether to buy, to sell, or to
hold a particular security.155 It follows that the role of the regulators in
this type of a regime is to create high quality, disclosure-based regulations that will supply the market with the optimal amount of information
necessary for the market participants to make sound investment decisions. As such, IOSCO’s second principle, merits further consideration,
namely with respect to the purpose of short position disclosure and reporting obligations.
In the securities markets, the price of a security ideally reflects all publicly-available information about the issuer, as well as other economic
151. See id.
152. Karmel & Kelly, supra note 105, at 914.
153. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Opening Remarks at SEC Roundtable on Modernizing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Disclosure System (Oct. 8, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch100808cc.htm (explaining that
since its foundation, the SEC’s purpose has been to maintain investor confidence in the
markets by providing them with reliable information).
154. Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks before the Symposium on “The
Past, Present and Future of the SEC” (Oct. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch101609tap.htm (explaining that collective
judgment of the informed marketplace should be respected as a worthy alternative to
more substantive government control of private sector conduct) [hereinafter Paredes
Speech].
155. The SEC believes that “[o]nly through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive,
and accurate information can people make sound investment decisions. The result of this
information flow is a far more active, efficient, and transparent capital market that facilitates the capital formation so important to our nation’s economy.” The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital
Formation, http://sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).

986

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 35:3

conditions. For financial markets to function, the information driving the
trading of the securities should be reliable and transparent.156 Thus, disclosure requirements are necessary to achieve transparency in the market
and place market participants in a position to effectively evaluate investment opportunities.157
While public knowledge of short selling differs among jurisdictions,
markets where short position disclosure requirements are implemented
tend to be better informed than those where there are no such requirements.158 This is in part because short position disclosures may enhance
the availability of information related to the issuers and the price of their
securities. Specifically, short sellers, by betting on a company’s stock
price decline, signal to the market their view of the company’s prospects.159 In this manner, greater disclosure about short selling activities
may provide more information to the market about an issuer, which in
turn may enhance price discovery. A better-informed market makes it
more difficult for market manipulators to spread false rumors in order to
manipulate the price of a security.160 In this sense, regulatory disclosures
operate as a necessary means to ensure investor protection.161 Therefore,
appropriate levels of short selling disclosure may supply investors with
relevant information, enhance market efficiency and potentially deter
market abuse.162 It is important to note that reporting of short positions
should be timely to prevent information from becoming stale before it
reaches the market.163
While disclosure of information is generally considered to be an effective means of achieving market efficiency and investor protection, not all
information is valuable, and information may be subject to misinterpretation.164 Information overload (i.e., when too much information is released
into the market) impairs the ability of a market participant to distinguish
what is important in making his or her investment decisions and frustrates the purpose of the disclosure.165 Moreover, the information ob156. Indeed, some regulatory authorities consider that insufficient transparency was at
the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. Cox Speech, supra note128.
157. Paredes Speech, supra note 154.
158. TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35.
159. In this manner, short sellers contribute to assessing the true value of a company’s
stock. Id.
160. Sheehan, supra note 6, at 9.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 14.
164. Id.
165. Paredes Speech, supra note 154 (explaining that when information is not
processed and interpreted effectively, disclosure does not translate into better decision-
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tained from a short sale may be ambiguous and open to various interpretations.166 A short sale itself may not provide enough information to the
market about the short seller’s motive. For example, from the short itself
it may be unclear whether the short seller sold the security short in order
to express a negative view about the issuer or simply hedge167 another
position.
Mandatory disclosure also imposes substantial compliance costs on
market participants.168 Such costs are normally related to the implementation of disclosure mechanisms and compliance costs incurred by the
constituents subject to the regulatory disclosure regime. An additional
cost of information disclosure may be incurred by the market where public disclosure of short positions could compromise proprietary trading
strategies169 and discourage hedging activity.170 Because industry experts
recognize non-manipulative short selling strategies, including hedging,
as socially valuable, markets may actually become less transparent and
consequently, less informed when stringent disclosure obligations result
in overall less short selling.171 Empirical studies further suggest that high
quality disclosures reduce the incentives for market participants to search
for information.172 In other words, full transparency in the market will
give the investors less incentive to gather new information because they

making. As Justice Marshall (quoted by Commissioner Paredes) stated, “management’s
fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the shareholders
in an avalanche of trivial information—a result that is hardly conductive to informed
decision-making.” Therefore disclosure can result in less transparency and worse decisions).
166. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 15.
167. A hedge is an investment made for the purpose of reducing the risk of adverse
price
movements
in
an
asset.
Investopedia,
Hedge
Definition,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedge.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2010). Investors use
this strategy when they are unsure of what the market will do. Id. For example, if an investor believes that the stock price of an issuer will rise in the near term due to a positive
event for that issuer, the investor will purchase the issuer’s stock. However, since the
investor is interested in the issuer rather than the industry, he or she may hedge industry
risk (or the risk that the industry which the issuer is in will experience decline) by short
selling an equal value of shares of the issuer’s direct competitor, who happens to be in the
same industry. Id. In this manner, the investor decreases, or hedges industry risk related
to the stock he or she desires to purchase. Id.
168. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 4–6.
169. “Proprietary” relates to information in which the owner has a protectable interest.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
170. TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35, at 15–17 (describing short sale disclosure
as a two—edged sword); id. at 5.
171. Paredes Speech, supra note 154.
172. Brown and Hillegeist, supra note 95.
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would not be compensated for the resources they expend.173 Therefore,
many regulatory authorities recognize the importance of providing the
market with valuable information, while attempting to maintain the incentives for market participants to search for new information.174
In sum, when establishing disclosure and reporting regimes, regulators
should be clear about the objectives of such regulations.175 The abovementioned evidence concerning the effects of short position disclosure
on the markets indicates that the most optimal regulations would ensure
that investors receive socially-valuable information resulting from short
selling activity and protect proprietary interests in gathering new information. Therefore, it is important to identify specific disclosure requirements that will allow for the most beneficial flow of information to the
public markets. IOSCO’s second principle of short selling regulation
identifies various disclosure methods implemented by different jurisdictions but does not advance a solution that would unify current short position disclosure regimes.
C. IOSCO’s Disclosure Approach Poses the Risks of Information Asymmetry and Regulatory Arbitrage
As discussed earlier, the primary motivation for legislative measures
with respect to short selling is to ensure more effective reporting of short
selling information.176 In order to achieve this result, domestic regulators
have implemented largely divergent approaches to setting short selling
disclosure obligations for market participants.177 IOSCO’s second principle of short selling regulation addresses international discrepancies in
reporting requirements by identifying two different methods of disclosure: (1) flagging of short sales178 and (2) short positions reporting.179
While IOSCO recognizes that “both models have their own merits,” it
neither endorses a specific measure, nor proposes a consistent regulatory
standard for short position disclosure requirements.180 This approach
173. FSA SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 22.
174. Sheehan, supra note 6.
175. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8.
176. Sheehan, supra note 6, at 27.
177. TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35.
178. CESR SHORT SELLING MEASURES, supra note 34, at 6; SHORT SELLING REPORT,
supra note 8, at 16 (explaining that the strategy makes a short sale trade easily traceable).
179. CESR defines this concept as the “requirement to report individual significant
short positions whether to the regulator and/or the market.” THE COMMITTEE OF
EUROPEAN SECURITIES REGULATORS (“CESR”), MODEL FOR A PAN-EUROPEAN SHORT
SELLING DISCLOSURE REGIME, CESR/10-088 (Mar. 2010); Short Selling Report, supra
note 8, at 16.
180. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 12.
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sends a mixed message to the international securities industry and does
not resolve the issue of regulatory dissonance in the area.
Although the flagging method is used by some countries such as Canada and Greece, IOSCO and CESR have identified certain flaws with
mandating uniform flagging requirements.181 This method requires a
marker to be placed on each individual short sale order that a broker
sends to a regulated market or alternative trading venue for execution.182
The market then reads the order as a short sale, rather than just a sale of a
security.183 One issue with this approach is that while flagging short sales
provides regulators with real-time data encompassing intra-day activities,
the process of its aggregation raises issues of information redundancy
(e.g., a large part of this information is already captured in the form of
stock lending data).184 The concern is that the costs incurred through aggregating and disclosing already-available information may outweigh
any potential benefit of releasing such information into the market.185 In
addition, the market may encounter information overload, as supplying it
with duplicative information will likely confuse, rather than help market
participants.186
The flagging approach also presents a lack of clarity with respect to the
actual outstanding short positions, such that regulators would not be able
to readily identify large short positions or aggressive short selling.187
Marking an order as a short sale does not necessarily offer specific insight into whether the short seller is expressing a negative view about the
issuer or simply hedging his position.188 Therefore, market authorities
would not receive enough information via flagging to determine whether
a market participant is aggressively short selling the issuer’s stock to
manipulate the price of the stock, to express concerns about the issuer’s
financial health, or to simply hedge other positions.189 In addition, be-

181. See Press Release, CESR, CESR to Consult on Pan-European Short Selling Disclosure Regime (July 8, 2009), available at www.cesr.eu/popup2.php?id=5792 [hereinafter Press Release, CESR].
182. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 15.
183. Id.
184. CESR SHORT SELLING MEASURES, supra note 34; SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra
note 8, at 16.
185. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.
186. See FSA SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 22.
187. See id; SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8.
188. See FSA SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 22.
189. Even if purchase orders, which cancel out the existing short position, are flagged,
this issue cannot be completely resolved. This is because “short sellers do not need to go
to the market to close the short positions in some cases. For example, they may acquire
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cause only a few jurisdictions implement this approach, achieving uniformity via flagging would be extremely cumbersome on market participants.190 Regulated entities and/or stock exchanges that are currently
subject to disclosure-based regimes would be required to contribute or
divert considerable resources to operational and compliance measures in
order to implement the system.191 In sum, while IOSCO does not take a
definitive position on flagging as a disclosure mechanism, the SEC, FSA
and CESR all favor short position reporting instead of the flagging approach, as way to disclose short sales to the market.192
Short position disclosure necessarily requires a system of reporting
short selling information either to the market or market authorities.193 In
developing a system of reporting, regulators must balance the utility of
information disclosure to the market against the costs of providing such
information.194 Among other things, short position reporting raises concerns with respect to the appropriate trigger level of reporting, whether
the focus should be on net or gross short position reporting, the timing of
reporting, the types of securities reportable, and whether the short position details should be confidentially disclosed to the regulators or publicly disclosed to the market.195 The notification of short positions exceeding a de minimis level deals with the trigger level of short positions reporting.196 For example, some markets require reporting of existing short
positions once the positions exceed 0.25% of the issued share capital of
the relevant stocks.197 The Short Selling Report suggests that the trigger
level of reporting should not be set so high as to prevent the flow of useful information.198 On the other hand, setting the threshold too low may
be overly burdensome on those responsible for reporting.199 Essentially,
IOSCO leaves the issue of determining the trigger level at the discretion
of national regulators.200

the equity shares from other instruments (such as options) to close the short positions.”
SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 15.
190. See also Press Release, CESR, supra note 181.
191. Id.
192. CESR SHORT SELLING MEASURES, supra note 34; FSA SHORT SELLING, supra
note 22; SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8.
193. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 10.
194. See generally Paredes Speech, supra note 154.
195. See generally SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 12–15.
196. Id. at 14.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 30.
199. Id. at 14.
200. Id.
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The decision regarding whether short position reporting should be implemented on a gross or net basis means determining whether to report
current overall short sales of an issuer (gross basis) or current overall
exposure to an issuer (net basis).201 The benefit of net position reporting
is that it takes into account long positions in the stock, which may cancel
out the short positions.202 For example, if the holder of a disclosed gross
short position also has a similar-sized long position in the issuer, the positions cancel out and the holder is in fact “flat.” Gross position reporting
does not take this into account and only shows the holder’s total short
exposure to the issuer.203 Thus, net position reporting may be more useful
than gross position reporting because it provides more accurate information about the total current short interest in the security.204
In order to be effective, IOSCO suggests that short position reporting
should be timely.205 The time lag between the creation of positions and
their reporting may render the information stale.206 The timeliness of
available information raises the issue of whether short position information should be reported confidentially to the market authorities or publicly disclosed to the market. Public disclosure of significant individual
short positions may have harmful commercial effects mentioned earlier,
such as the disclosure of a proprietary trading strategy.207 In addition,
public disclosure may make those holding large short positions in an issuer subject to a “short squeeze.”208 In this situation, when the demand
for stock exceeds its supply, the rapid increase in the price of the stock
may force short sellers to purchase the stock at a substantially higher
price in order to cover their short positions, thus incurring large economic losses from the transaction.209

201. Id.
202. FSA SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 22.
203. Id.
204. This is especially relevant when a holder of disclosed gross short position also has
a similarly—sized long position, which cancels out his short position. As such, gross
position disclosure would not reflect accurate information related to the investor’s total
holdings of the security. Id. at 30.
205. SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8, at 14.
206. See FSA SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 22.
207. See discussion, supra p. 26.
208. See FSA SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 22.
209. National
Futures
Association,
Glossary,
http://www.nfa.futures.org/BASICNET/glossary.aspx?term=S (last visited Jan. 27, 2010)
(A similar situation occurred in October 2008, when a short squeeze exponentially increased the price of the Volkswagen shares, temporarily making it the most valuable
company in the world).
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While public disclosure of short positions poses commercial concerns,
confidential disclosure to a regulator may be less efficient due to the time
lag created by reporting the information to market authorities before disclosing it publically.210 As the time lag increases, the potential benefits
derived from disclosures in terms of informed decision-making decrease.211 Still, disclosure to regulatory authorities may be helpful in
identifying any unusual short selling activities potentially giving rise to
market abuse.212 Once notified of potentially troublesome transactions, a
regulator would then be able to determine whether intervention is required.213
While addressing each of the above considerations, IOSCO fails to arrive at an internationally consistent approach or set a minimum threshold
of short position reporting, instead leaving the ultimate decision with
domestic regulators.214 The organization’s second principle of short selling regulation also does not take into consideration every asset class in
which a seller may express short interest.215 For example, securities that
trade as common stock in the local market are also available to trade in
foreign markets as depository receipts.216 When trading in the same security is fragmented among different markets, arbitrageurs stand ready to
take advantage of any gap that develops in the price of the security. As
discussed earlier, because the price of a security ideally reflects all relevant information pertaining to the issuer, any information asymmetries
resulting from different regulatory regimes may in fact create an arbitrage opportunity.217 This is because information asymmetry could potentially affect the pricing of securities that trade on numerous national
markets.218 In other words, if the regulatory regime in one jurisdiction

210. FSA SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 22, at 29.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Depository receipts are “negotiable certificate[s] held in the bank of one country
representing a specific number of shares of a stock traded on an exchange of another
country. [These may] make it easier for individuals to invest in foreign companies, due to
the widespread availability of price information, lower transaction costs, and timely dividend distributions.” Investor Words, Global Depository Receipt Definition,
http://www.investorwords.com/2180/Global_Depositary_Receipt.html (last visited Oct
23, 2009).
217. See discussion, supra pp.16–17.
218. For example, the price of the security trading on Hong Kong’s exchange may
incorporate certain information that is not available and therefore not incorporated in the
price of the same security trading in the US market. In fact, IOSCO recognized this issue
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institutes less rigorous (or ineffective) short selling disclosure requirements, the price of a security trading in that jurisdiction will reflect less
information about the issuer. Consequently, the same security trading in
a different jurisdiction with more rigorous disclosure requirements will
have a different price because it will likely reflect more information. The
market which is dominant in the provision of information would also be
dominant in the pricing of the securities traded on that market.219 In this
manner, information asymmetry stemming from different regulatory regimes may contribute to the difference in the prices of same security
trading in different jurisdictions. The subsequent price difference of the
same security may create a riskless profit opportunity and further contribute to regulatory arbitrage.220
Another potential effect of regulatory arbitrage stemming from different short position disclosure requirements is the frustration of purpose or
values advanced by the domestic regulatory regime. To illustrate, if a
market participant wishes to short sell a stock that is exchange-listed in a
jurisdiction that requires full position disclosure, he or she may be inclined to circumvent more stringent disclosure regulations by short selling the depository receipts, which are trading in a jurisdiction with less
aggressive disclosure requirements.221 This is problematic when two jurisdictions have strong but opposite opinions as to what level of disclosure is best.222 The jurisdiction which adheres to stringent disclosure
principles will find that its regulations are undermined when investors
choose to short sell depository receipts, which trade in a jurisdiction with
less stringent disclosure requirements. IOSCO’s principles do not address this regulatory concern.
IOSCO’s Short Selling Report repeatedly concedes that the regulation
of short selling activities varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending on a range of domestic factors, including, but not limited to, market
conditions and domestic regulatory landscape.223 Responding to these
concerns, “international standards usually grant a fair amount of discretion to national regulators.”224 However, IOSCO grants national regulators virtually unlimited discretion in implementing short sale reporting

in its Transparency Report. See TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35, at 23 (stating that
an issue might arise if different venues are subject to different disclosure requirements).
219. Licht, supra note 94, at 566.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. Id. at 630.
223. See id.
224. Karmel & Kelly, supra note 105, at 963.
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obligations.225 The organization’s failure to resolve regulatory dissonance
leaves national regulators with no other source for arriving at consistent
international standards of short selling regulation in times of greatest
economic need.226 Discretion is by definition nontransparent, and the fact
that IOSCO’s national regulators develop standards that grant those same
regulators virtually unlimited discretion is troubling,227 as this ultimately
leaves securities regulation in the hands of national regulators who are
not required to arrive at consistent international standards.228 Therefore,
while some discretion should be afforded to national regulators in order
to fine-tune IOSCO’s principles of securities regulation to be more in
line with domestic needs, unlimited discretion could leave the markets
without any internationally consistent regulatory principles. The organization’s Short Selling Report fails to address the concern shared by many
regulators that information asymmetries between informed short sellers
and uninformed market participants could result in price variations.229
Once price variations occur, the gateway is opened for regulatory arbitrage, where market manipulators are free to take advantage of lessinformed markets.
III. CESR’S SHORT POSITION DISCLOSURE APPROACH
There are a number of different approaches to implementing internationally consistent short position disclosure regulations. 230 For example,
the SEC, permits confidential short position disclosures to regulatory
authorities, while Self-Regulatory Organizations publish daily short selling volume and individual short sale transactions.231 The FSA, on the
other hand, considers public disclosure of relevant short sale positions to
be the key in improving transparency and market efficiency.232 One possible solution that attempts to reconcile conflicting disclosure standards is
CESR’s two-tiered system of disclosure.233
225. See SHORT SELLING REPORT, supra note 8; see also OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES
REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
226. Karmel & Kelly, supra note 105 at 910–11.
227. Id. at 935–946.
228. Id.
229. FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22, at 13.
230. TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 35, at 20–23.
231. Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 36.
232. See generally FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER, supra note 22. Critics of the SEC’s
approach argue that it is costly and inefficient because disclosure to the regulators leads
to the delay in public disclosure, eventually making the information useless. See Deloitte
Financial Group, Banking and Capital Markets Insight (Aug. 2009), MONDAQ, Sept. 2,
2009, available at 2009 WL 17191577.
233. Press Release, CESR, supra note 181.
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CESR’s first level of disclosure is the private short position disclosure
to a national regulator when that position reaches a specified initial threshold (CESR proposes to set this threshold at 0.1% of the company’s
issued share capital).234 This technique provides the regulators with early
warning signs of large short position accumulations, thereby alerting
them to potentially abusive behavior and allowing them to monitor and
take action more effectively.235 If the short position reaches a second-tier
threshold (proposed at 0.5%), the holder of the position would be required to publicly disclose the position to the market.236 Disclosure calculations and reports would be made on a net basis237 and reported on the
day following the day on which the relevant trigger threshold was
crossed.238 CESR also makes room for exemptions from disclosure obligations for short positions resulting from market making activities.239
IV. CONCLUSION
While CESR’s approach is subject to some criticism,240 its objectives
are not unlike those of IOSCO, in that CESR aims at harmonizing the
disclosure regime for short selling within the European Union.241 As
such, CESR illustrates that it is possible to implement clear, meaningful
standards with respect to short selling regulation and disclosure requirements. While this Note does not advocate CESR’s specific approach as
the best-fitting international regulatory measure for short position disclosure, CESR’s approach illustrates a compromise among the European
Union’s national regulators and an implementation of functional and
specific regulatory standards.
IOSCO is an “international association of securities regulators with
tremendous influence on the development of international norms for the
regulation of securities.”242 In times of economic crises, international
legislative bodies tend to look to IOSCO for advice on appropriate regu234. Id.
235. Id. at 5.
236. Any private or public disclosure would also be necessary if the positions fell below any of the trigger thresholds or crossed the incremental 0.1%. Id.
237. Any long economic exposures to the subject security would need to be subtracted
from the short position. Id.; CESR SHORT SELLING MEASURES, supra note 34.
238. See CESR SHORT SELLING MEASURES, supra note 34.
239. Id. Generally, market makers are entities that as part of their businesses, deal as
principals in securities in order to (i) fulfill clients’ orders and/or (ii) provide liquidity on
a regular basis to the market on both, bid and offer sides. FSA SHORT SELLING PAPER,
supra note 22, at 33.
240. See Deloitte Financial Group, supra note 232.
241. Id.
242. Karmel & Kelly, supra note 105, at 898 (internal quotations omitted).

996

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 35:3

latory measures and to “bring a consensus to the complex and divergent
regimes that exist globally.”243 To wit, it is the only organization with the
power to develop internationally consistent standards of short selling
regulation through its consultation papers and reports.244
Without clear and consistent guidelines, regulatory dissonance in disclosure obligations breeds information asymmetry among jurisdictions,
which erodes market efficiency. The differences in regulatory short position disclosure regimes may also invite unwanted regulatory arbitrage.
Many industry experts believe that the securities industry requires a uniform approach to short selling regulation, which can operate on a crossborder basis.245 This type of a regime could eradicate the negative effects
of information asymmetry and regulatory arbitrage. These experts also
propose that achieving internationally consistent standards of regulation
could significantly improve investor confidence and reduce systemic risk
in global capital markets.246 Considering the risks that information
asymmetry and regulatory arbitrage may pose to the international securities industry, the organization’s short position disclosure and reporting
principles should embody the best-fitting rules, which provide the international securities industry with clarity and consistency in the area of
short selling regulation.
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